Boeing Corporate Culture

 Boeing Culture

I have been watching the Youtube coverage of the Alaska Airlines Boeing 737-9 Max carefully to see if anyone caught the problem that has been obvious since the MCAS debacle. So far everyone is focussed on the door plug hinges, the roller tracks at the top of the door, and the conditions of the bolts that hold it all together. 

So far, the reports are all on the details of the mechanical defects. The real problem is the company culture. Sure, blame the workers who didn’t put it together correctly. Blame the lack of QC inspectors who failed to catch the error. They are looking in the wrong place. Raise your sights!

People were trying to tell management about the quality problems on the floor. They were ignored, or in the worst case, fired. That culture is not just at Boeing. From the frozen O-rings on the solid rocket boosters to the heat shields on the shuttle wings, people who knew the problems were ignored until disaster happened.

The cultural problems have to do with the way the company is structured, with people who know the problems at the bottom, and people who have the power to do something about the problems at the top, and then the several layers of middle managers in between who add almost nothing to the process. In my experience, they function as a wall to prevent information from getting to the top. They really don’t like Quality Control Inspectors because they know it will reflect badly on their fiefdom.

From my forty years of working for large electric generation companies, I have enough stories for several hours of ranting. I will spare you all!

I will have hope that the operational culture problems are being addressed when the whistleblowers who were fired are hired back with bonuses and backpay and promoted to jobs in the QC department, and the managers who fired them are sent down the road kicking a can.